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Abstract
A simple backward-looking Taylor rule is estimated in a time-varying coe±cient framework
with quarterly German data for the period 1975-1998. Markov switching models and the
Kalman ¯lter are used to extract the unobservable paths of the coe±cients. The main
¯nding is that the in°ation aversion of the Bundesbank was not constant over time and
exhibits some sudden and large shifts during the period of monetary targeting. There are
phases with low and with high in°ation aversion. This could for example explain why the
estimated value of the in°ation coe±cient in backward-looking Taylor rules often does not
exceed one and so violates the implications of theoretical monetary policy models. More-
over, the results provide evidence that the Bundesbank followed the so-called "opportunistic
approach" to disin°ation.
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Over the last decade the new-keynesian models with microeconomic background gained a lot of
popularity. This recent development leads also to growing interest in issues of optimal design
of monetary policy and theoretically founded monetary policy rules. In small new-keynesian
models monetary policy rules often have structure, which is very similar to the well known rule
of Taylor (1993).
In the Taylor rule the interest rate is a function only of in°ation gap and output gap. Taylor
(1993) found that this very simple rule is able to describe the behavior of the Fed in the
period 1987-1992 relatively well. Plenty of papers followed the publication of Taylor (1993),
whose authors reported econometric estimations of Taylor-like monetary policy rules for dif-
ferent countries. Econometric research in this area raised the questions of structural stability
of the estimated monetary policy rules, because structural breaks in the estimated policy rules
may re°ect changes in operating procedures and design of monetary policy. Clarida, Gali,
Gertler (1999), for example, estimate a monetary policy rule for the samples before and
after the Volcker disin°ation period and ¯nd that the reaction function of the Fed has remark-
ably changed after the Volcker disin°ation period. The estimation results show that since the
Volcker period the Fed reacts much more aggressively to the changes in the in°ation gap. Also
Sims (2001) estimates a monetary policy reaction function of the Fed, permitting for several
possible patterns of time variation in both its coe±cients and its disturbance variances. The
variation is estimated using Markov switching models as evolving in a stochastic, repeating
pattern, not as evolution from one style of policy to another. In contrast to Clarida, Gali,
Gertler (1999) the regime shifts estimated by Sims (2001) do not last very long and appear
to re°ect temporary shifts in the level of policy activism, not systematic improvement. De-
mers, Rodrguez (2001) investigate the stability of the Taylor rule under the period 1963(2)
to 1999(4) using Canadian data. They show that the monetary rule cannot be evaluated over
this period without taking into account parameter instability and structural changes, re°ecting
changes in monetary policy preferences. Using Kalman ¯lter to estimate the monetary rule,
evidence is found that the parameters are su®ering from important changes during the period
of the ¯rst oil shock, the late seventies and early eighties, thus capturing the adoption of the
explicit in°ation targeting policy by the Bank of Canada.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the possible changes of the monetary policy of the
2Bundesbank in the period of monetary targeting. The focus of the Bundesbank policy on the
in°ation control is well known and therefore the emphasis of the current econometric analysis is
put only on the changes in the reaction to in°ationary developments. The research strategy is
very simple. Firstly, a linear Taylor-like reaction function with partial adjustment is estimated.
The linear speci¯cation with dynamic adjustment serves as a benchmark for the following state
space speci¯cations. Secondly, the coe±cient, which is responsible for the Bundesbank reaction
to in°ationary development, is allowed to vary over time in the state space framework. Then
the results of the linear and state space estimations are compared. The variation of only one
coe±cient in the equation makes the estimation more stable and easy to interpret than the
variation of all coe±cients. In particular the Markov switching models and Kalman ¯lter are
used to estimate the changes in the in°ation aversion of the Bundesbank.
The reason for the choice of Markov switching models and Kalman ¯lter in the current em-
pirical investigation is the extraordinary °exibility of this class of models. In both models the
dynamics of state variables is assumed to be exogen, which allows to avoid the choice of an
explicit transition function and transition variables like in STR- or in SETAR-models. Thus,
no explicit assumptions about how the Bundesbank changes the design of its own policy over
time are necessary in the empirical investigation. In the case of this paper this is not a disad-
vantage, because no estimation of a model with any predictive power in relation to the changes
in the monetary policy is purposed.
The layout of the article is as follows. Section 2 describes the model and econometric tools used
for its estimation. Section 3 provides a brief description of the data used for the estimations
and its properties. The empirical results are collected in section 4. The ¯nal section provides
a possible interpretation of the results and some concluding remarks.
2 The model and econometric tools
2.1 The model
The structure and parameters of the Taylor rule are well known:
it = ¹ r + ¼t + 0:5(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼) + 0:5xt (1)
or in other form
it = ¹ r + ¹ ¼ + 1:5(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼) + 0:5xt (2)
3where ¹ r and ¹ ¼ are the constant values of the real interest rate and the in°ation target of the
central bank under consideration. it is the short-term nominal interest rate, which is assumed
to be monetary policy instrument of a central bank under consideration. Finally ¼t and xt are
in°ation and output gap. Taylor (1993) shows that this monetary policy rule yields a good
performance describing the behavior of the Fed in the period 1987-1992.
The functional structure of the Taylor rule is supported through theoretical implications of the
new-keynesian models. For example, Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1999) assume a quadratic
loss function of a central bank and forward looking behavior of economic agents and show that
the optimal policy rule has the following form
it = °¼Et¼t+1 + °ggt (3)
where °¼ > 1, °g > 0 and ¼t describes the deviation of in°ation from the target of the central
bank.1 gt could be interpreted as a demand shock. The result that °¼ > 1 has crucial empirical
implications and means that a rise of the short nominal rate in response to a rise of the in°ation
gap is high enough to cause also a rise in the real interest rates. Thus the estimated value of
°¼ can be used as a very simple measure of the monetary policy "quality". A good monetary
policy should put emphasis on ¯ghting in°ation and so lead to an estimated value of °¼ > 1.
The version of the equation (2), which can be estimated, has three unknown parameters
it = ® + ¯(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼) + °xt + ut (4)
where ® = ¹ r+ ¹ ¼. No forward-looking speci¯cation are considered and estimated in this paper.
The reason for this restriction is the concentration on the estimation of time-varying coe±-
cients, while most empirical studies incorporating forward-looking behavior are accomplished
under the assumption of parameter constance.
The assumption of the constant in°ation target ¹ ¼ often turns out to be not very realistic.
This assumption is slightly relaxed in the context of the current analysis. The in°ation goal
published o±cially by the Bundesbank is used as a measure for ¹ ¼, denoted below by ¹ ¼t. The
equation (4) is rewritten accordingly
it = ¹ r + ¹ ¼t + ¯(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼t) + °xt + ut (5)
where the real interest rate ¹ r is estimated directly. The problem is that the estimated residuals
^ ut often contain strong autocorrelation of the ¯rst order. This phenomenon is called interest
1In this case it denotes the deviation from the long-run equilibrium value of the nominal short rate.
4rate smoothing. There is no satisfactory theoretical explanation for this e®ect and therefore
in most econometric estimations the problem is solved simply by adding a lagged interest rate
as a regressor. The equation (5) is transformed as follows to incorporate the interest rate
smoothing:
it = [¹ r + ¹ ¼t + ¯(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼t) + °xt] ¢ (1 ¡ ½) + ½it¡1 + ut (6)
In the case of the autocorrelation of an order higher than one (6) is easily generalized in the
following way:
it = [¹ r + ¹ ¼t + ¯(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼t) + °xt] ¢ (1 ¡ ½) + ½1it¡1 + ::: + ½pit¡p + ut (7)
where ½ =
Pp
j=1 ½j is a persistence measure. The speci¯cation (6) or its generalized version
(7) is estimated with di®erent econometric methods. The results are reported in section 4.
2.2 Markov switching models
In the Markov switching framework a subset of the parameter set of an econometric model is
modelled as a function of a real valued discrete unobservable Markov chain. Thus, one cannot
say with certainty, in which state the system is at an assigned time t. Only a probability
to be in state j at the time t can be inferred. A good introduction about the theory and
application of Markov switching model is available for instance in Hamilton (1994). On
the other side Krolzig (1997) provides a very deep and detailed discussion of this class of
econometric models. In the remaining part of the subsection a brief formal description of the
Markov switching framework is provided.
Let fstg1
t=1 be a sequence of discrete random variables with sample space ­ = f1;2;:::;Ng.
The sequence fstg1
t=1 is called to be a Markov chain of the ¯rst order, if the following statement
is true:
Prfst = jjst¡1 = i;st¡2 = k;:::g = Prfst = jjFt¡1g = Prfst = jjst¡1 = ig = pji
where Ft¡1 denotes the information set available until t ¡ 1. The Markov chain is called a
Markov chain of the ¯rst order, because, like in case of an autoregressive process of order one,
only the ¯rst lag of the state in°uences the future of the process. The set of all transition
probabilities pji can be summarized into the so called transition matrix fpjig1·j;i·N, where
PN
j=1 pji = 1.
5A Markov switching model posseses the following structure
yt = x0
t'(st) + ut; ut » i:i:d:(0;§(st)) (8)
where st is an unobservable ¯rst order Markov chain discussed above and the vector xt includes
all exogenous and lagged endogenous regressors. An important assumption is exogenity of the
Markov chain st. Under assumption of known or any given parameters £ some extraction
algorithm is needed to gain some information about the evolution of the state st over time. We
denote Ys = fy1;:::;ys;x1;:::;xsg as all available information until s for this purpose. The
probabilities Prfst = jjYt¡1;£g, Prfst = jjYt;£g and Prfst = jjYT;£g are called forecasted,
¯ltered and smoothed probabilities respectively. These probabilities are calculated for each data
point t and collected into time series, which can be used for economic interpretation of the
empirical results. These time series contain all information about the state of model (8) condi-
tional on s and parameter values £. Obviously, the smoothed probabilities Prfst = jjYT;£g
are the best inference about the unobserved state st, because they contain all information
available to an econometrician. A nonlinear recursive algorithm for the extraction of ¯ltered
probabilities can be derived using the calculation rule for conditional probabilities:
PrfAjBg =
PrfA \ Bg
PrfBg
Another recursive algorithm uses the ¯ltered probabilities as input to calculate smoothed proba-
bilities. For the derivation and deeper discussion of both algorithms it is referred to Hamilton
(1994) or Krolzig (1997) to keep the extent of the current paper within a limit.
The forecasted probabilities Prfst = jjYt¡1;£g can be used to derive the conditional density
of the dependent variable
f(ytjYt¡1;£) =
N X
j=1
Prfst = jjYt¡1;£g ¢ f(ytjst = j;Yt¡1;£) (9)
which leads to the conditional likelihood function
L(£) =
T Y
t=1
f(ytjYt¡1;£): (10)
The ML-estimates are now obtained through the maximization of the conditional loglikelihood
logL(£) =
T X
t=1
log
N X
j=1
Prfst = jjYt¡1;£g ¢ f(ytjst = j;Yt¡1£): (11)
6To perform the estimations, the equation (6) under assumption of normality of ut is directly
used for the evaluation of the loglikelihood (11). As mentioned above, only the coe±cient
responsible for the reaction of a central bank to in°ation gap is allowed to vary over time. So
the model (6) in the Markov switching case is written as follows
it = [¹ r + ¹ ¼t + ¯(st)(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼t) + °xt] ¢ (1 ¡ ½) + ½it¡1 + ut; ut » N(0;¾2) (12)
where st is a ¯rst order Markov chain as stated above. The number of regimes is assumed to
be two, st 2 f1;2g. The BFGS maximization procedure implemented in Ox2 is used to obtain
the ML-estimates of speci¯cation (12).
2.3 Kalman ¯lter
In the remaining part of the section a brief formal description of Kalman ¯lter and corre-
sponding state space framework is provided. The concept of Kalman ¯lter was developed by
Kalman (1960, 1963) and is based on the state space representation of dynamic systems.
In the state space framework it is possible to extract the moments of unobservable stochastic
components from observable stochastic processes.
Let yt be a vector of observable variables and ®t an unobservable vector of state variables.
Then the state space representation of a linear dynamic system can be written down as follows
yt = ct + Zt®t + "t (13)
®t+1 = dt + Tt®t + vt (14)
where ct, dt are vectors and Zt, Tt matrices, which are also allowed to be time dependent. "t
and vt are i.i.d. errors processes allowed to be correlated. Equation (13) is called the signal
equation and equation (14) is the corresponding state equation. Because the vector process
®t is unobservable, statistical inference about ®t is needed. The terminology used below is
similar to the case of Markov switching. The set of all available information until the time s
is denoted by Ys = fy1;:::;ys;x1;:::;xsg, where xt is the vector of exogenous variables at the
time t. Given some value of the population parameter vector £ and Ys, the Kalman ¯lter and
smoother allows to calculate conditional moments of the state vector at the time t. According
2The programming language Ox 3.30 Console was used to write the estimation procedures, downloaded
from http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Users/Doornik/
7to the formal description of the Markov switching framework we distinguish between forecasted,
¯ltered and smoothed inference about the state ®t, denoted as follows
atjt¡1 = E[®tjYt¡1;£] (15)
atjt = E[®tjYt;£] (16)
atjT = E[®tjYT;£]: (17)
Conditional covariance matrices can be assigned to each expectation term above
Ptjt¡1 = V ar[®tjYt¡1;£] (18)
Ptjt = V ar[®tjYt;£] (19)
PtjT = V ar[®tjYT;£]: (20)
For the derivation and deeper discussion of Kalman ¯lter, it can referred for example to Hamil-
ton (1994) or Durbin, Coopman (2001). As in the case of Markov switching the ¯ltering
algorithm can be used for the evaluation of the likelihood function under some distributional
assumption, for example normal distribution
ytjYt¡1 » N(atjt¡1;Ptjt¡1)
which leads to the loglikehood function
logL(£) =
T X
t=1
logf(ytjYt¡1;£): (21)
For the empirical purposes of this paper it is assumed that the coe±cient ¯ follows a random
walk. Now the equation (6) can be written as follows
it = [¹ r + ¹ ¼t + ¯t(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼t) + °xt] ¢ (1 ¡ ½) + ½it¡1 + ut (22)
¯t+1 = ¯t + vt; E[utvt] = 0 (23)
No correlation between ut and vt is allowed, otherwise the unsystematic monetary policy would
in°uence the parameters of systematic monetary policy in the long run, which is not a very
feasible assumption. The ML-estimation is performed using EViews 4.1, which allows the
estimation of a relatively large class of state space models.
83 Data
All estimations are performed for the period 1975(1)-1998(4) with quarterly German data.
The day-to-day German market rate (so called overnight rate) is considered as the monetary
policy instrument of the Bundesbank and is the dependent variable in all equations.
The output gap is an unobservable time series and has to be extracted from the available
observable time series of the German GDP. The time series of the GDP used for the calculation
of the output gap is seasonally adjusted by using X12-ARIMA (adjusted for outliers and
calender e®ects) and is based on the ESVG 95 standard for GDP calculation. This time
series, which was calculated backwards for West Germany until 1970, is available from the
German Statistical O±ce since August 2003. From 1970 to 1990 the data are West German
data, from 1991 onwards the data for Germany until the second quarter 2003 is used. The
time series were chained using the relationship of the 1991 values of German real GDP to
West German real GDP as a conversion factor. To calculate the output gap, the time series
of the real GDP in logs is ¯ltered using Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter with the smoothing parameter
¸ = 1600. The di®erence between the real GDP in logs and the potential output is the resulting
output gap. As a measure of in°ation one-year growth rates3 of the the German CPI time
series are employed.
To perform the estimation of the policy rule with time dependent in°ation target ¹ ¼t, the
in°ation target of the Bundesbank is used. It can be derived from the Bundesbank's formulation
of its target for monetary growth as published in its monthly reports. These ¯gures until 1993
are for example collected in Clarida (1996) and were also employed in this paper. The period
from 1994 until 1998 was ¯lled with ¯gures from the monthly reports of the Bundesbank. Both
time series, ¼t and ¹ ¼t, are displayed in ¯gure (1).
4 Empirical Results
As outlined above three speci¯cations are estimated. The ¯rst speci¯cation is a special case of
term (7) and is estimated with nonlinear least squares. Then, the Markov switching speci¯ca-
tion (12) and the state space model (22) follow. The results are reported below. Durbin-Watson
test statistic, Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test statistic, Q-statistic and Jarque-Bera
3Calculated as one-year percentage changes, ¼t =
Pt¡Pt¡4
Pt¡4 ¢ 100
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Figure 1: In°ation rate and in°ation target
test statistic are denoted by DW, LM, Q and JB. The corresponding p-values are in braces.
Standard errors, which corresponds to the estimated coe±cients, can be found in brackets.
Firstly, the estimated version of (7) is presented. The ¯rst and fourth lagged interest rate are
found to be signi¯cant.
Estimation sample : 1976(1) ¡ 1998(4)
^ it = [3:09
(0:41)
+ ¹ ¼t + 0.65
(0.31)
(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼t) + 1:00
(0:40)
xt] ¢ 0:15 + 1:00
(0:06)
it¡1 ¡ 0:15
(0:05)
it¡4
R2 = 0:94; AIC = 1:80; DW = 2:04; LM(4) = 1:14[0:89]; JB = 113:71[0:00]
(24)
The estimated value of the in°ation coe±cient is smaller than one, ^ ¯ < 1. This result is
unsatisfactory from the theoretical point of view. It indicates, that the Bundesbank does
not su±ciently rise the short nominal rate it in response to a rise in the in°ation gap and
therefore no rise in the real interest rates results. Furthermore, the Jarque-Bera test statistic
indicates nonnormality of residuals, which can be explained through the presence of outliers
in the residuals.
Now, the Markov switching estimation is presented. In this case only the ¯rst lag of the short
rate was signi¯cant and su±cient to remove the autocorrelation structure from the residuals.
Estimation sample : 1975(2) ¡ 1998(4)
10^ it =
8
> > <
> > :
[2:44
(0:42)
+ ¹ ¼t + 0.24
(0.33)
(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼t) + 1:64
(0:40)
xt] ¢ 0:13 + 0:87
(0:03)
it¡1; if st = 1
[2:44
(0:42)
+ ¹ ¼t + 9.34
(2.37)
(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼t) + 1:64
(0:40)
xt] ¢ 0:13 + 0:87
(0:03)
it¡1; if st = 2
logL = ¡71:15; AIC = 1:67; ^ P =
2
40:94 0:50
0:06 0:50
3
5
Q(1) = 2:67[0:10]; Q(4) = 4:90[0:30]; JB = 0:75[0:69]
(25)
The estimated transition matrix is denoted by ^ P. The examination of the estimated coe±cients
shows, that the estimated regimes are very di®erent. First of all, there is huge di®erence in the
in°ation aversion of the Bundesbank between these two regimes. In regime 1 (st = 1) there is
no signi¯cant reaction to in°ationary development at all. In contrast, regime 2 (st = 2) exhibits
a very strong reaction to the in°ation gap. Also a remarkable di®erence in the persistence of
two regime is apparent. The conditional probability to stay in regime 1, Prfst = 1jst¡1 = 1g,
is 0.94 and in regime 2, Prfst = 2jst¡1 = 2g, only 0.50. That means a much shorter expected
duration of the high in°ation aversion regime. It is also worth noting that in contrast to the
nonlinear least squares estimation the Jarque-Bera test statistic indicates normality of the
residuals. Obviously, the estimation of regime 2 with short duration removes some outliers
from the residuals and on the other hand it simpli¯es the lag structure of the estimated policy
rule. The fourth lag of the short-term interest rate is no more signi¯cant. In the ¯gure (2)
the time series of smoothed probabilities for regime 2 are displayed. However, the smoothed
probabilities should be compared with the macroeconomic variables used in the estimation to
obtain a possible economic interpretation. Overnight rate, in°ation and rescaled smoothed
probabilities from the previous ¯gure are collected in ¯gure (3). Obviously, the switches to the
regime of high in°ation aversion corresponds very well with the periods of strong interest rate
rises: two times in the end of seventies and begin of eighties and one time in the end of eighties.
Moreover, the ¯gure (3) shows that these switches could have been caused by the sharp rises
of in°ation. Surprisingly, the de°ation period in the second half of eighties does not lead to
any sharp rise of the smoothed probabilities of regime 2. This leads to the conclusion, that the
Bundesbank reacted asymmetrically to the °uctuations in the in°ation gap. The Bundesbank
pays a lot of attention to the positive deviations from the in°ation target. On the other hand
there are no signs, that the Bundesbank is very concerned about the negative deviations from
its own target.
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Figure 2: Smoothed probabilities for regime 2 from the equation (25)
The state space modelling with Kalman ¯lter supports the results of the Markov switching
estimation presented above. As outlined before it is assumed that the in°ation coe±cient in
the monetary policy rule, according to the speci¯cation (22), follows a random walk (without
drift). The model was estimated also with some other speci¯cations for the state variable, like a
stationary AR(1)-process, however, the estimation became unstable as the parameter number
in the state equation growths while the the results remain equivalent from the qualitative point
of view. Thus, only the estimated speci¯cation with a random walk as the state variable is
presented in (26) below.
Estimation sample : 1975(2) ¡ 1998(4)
^ itjT = [2:18
(0:48)
+ ¹ ¼t + ^ ¯tjT(¼t ¡ ¹ ¼t) + 0:61
(0:39)
xt] ¢ 0:15 + 0:85
(0:05)
it¡1
^ ¾2
signal = e^ °1; ^ °1 = ¡1:53
(0:16)
^ ¯t+1jT = ^ ¯tjT + ^ vtjT; ^ ¾2
v = e^ °2; ^ °2 = 0:37
(0:68)
logL = ¡90:58; AIC = 2:01
Q(1) = 0:18[0:67]; Q(4) = 5:29[0:26]; JB = 17:83[0:00]
(26)
First of all, the notation has to be explained. The smoothed state variable ¯t given the esti-
mated parameters is denoted by ^ ¯tjT. In other words, ^ ¯tjT can be described as the estimated
conditional expectation E[¯tjYT; ^ £] in termini of de¯nition (18). Accordingly, the adjusted
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Figure 3: Overnight rate, in°ation (boxes) and smoothed probabilities (pluses).
value of the nominal rate ^ it is denoted by ^ iijT if the smoothed state ^ ¯tjT is used to calculate
it. In the same manner, ^ ¯tjt¡1 and ^ ¯tjt lead to ^ iijt¡1 and ^ iijt.
Obviously, only a graphical illustration of the smoothed state ^ ¯tjT permits an economic in-
terpretation of the estimated model (26). In the ¯gure (4) the smoothed state variable ^ ¯tjT,
its con¯dence bounds and the smoothed probabilities (in other scaling) from (25) for com-
parison purposes are displayed. The con¯dence bounds of the smoothed state in the ¯gure
(4) are calculated as follows. Firstly, squared root of the diagonal elements of the estimated
state covariance matrices ^ PtjT is calculated. ^ PtjT is de¯ned as an estimated version of (18),
^ PtjT = V ar[¯tjYT; ^ £]. The square root of the diagonal elements can be interpreted as root
mean squared errors of ^ ¯tjT. Secondly, the con¯dence bounds themselves are calculated as
^ ¯tjT §2RMSE. The con¯dence bounds calculated in such way tend to underestimate the un-
certainty of the extracted state variable, because the uncertainty of the parameter estimation
is not included.
The resulting accordance of the Markov switching and Kalman ¯lter results is apparent. The
°uctuations of the smoothed probabilities and smoothed state variable ^ ¯tjT are very similar.
As in the case of the Markov switching speci¯cation there are two periods, when the reaction of
the Bundesbank to in°ationary developments is very strong: the time around 1980 and around
1990. Also the Kalman ¯lter results can be interpreted in termini of an asymmetric reaction
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Figure 4: Smoothed state ^ ¯tjT from (26), smoothed probabilities from (25).
function of the Bundesbank. No signi¯cant rise of the smoothed state ^ ¯tjT is observed during
the de°ation phase in the second half of the eighties.
5 Concluding Remarks
The main empirical result of this paper is the instability of the Bundesbank reaction to in°a-
tionary developments in Germany. But there is evidence from both empirical methods used
in the paper, that this is an instability only from a linear point of view because structural
breaks found in the data do not have any irreversible nature and seem to be caused through
the nonlinearity of the Bundesbank reaction function.
The instability and possible nonlinearity in the estimations can be interpreted as an asymme-
try in the reaction function of the Bundesbank. In this case the Bundesbank strongly reacts
to the positive deviation from its own in°ation target. On the other hand during the de°ation
phase in the second half of the eighties no signi¯cant reaction to this development could be
found.
The results in some other papers supports the results of the current work. For example, Clar-
14ida, Gertler (1996) found the estimated policy rule of the Bundesbank to be asymmetric.
Clarida, Gertler (1996) estimate a Taylor-like reaction function with monthly German
data and use the German industrial production to perform the output gap. They construct a
dummy, which is one if the in°ation gap is positive and zero otherwise. The estimated value
of the in°ation coe±cient is ^ ¯ = 1:60 in the periods of high in°ation and ^ ¯ = 0:28 otherwise.
There are some possible economic explanations for the asymmetric reaction to the in°ation
°uctuations. For example, for some reasons the Bundesbank could have asymmetric prefer-
ences for ¯ghting in°ation. From the theoretical point of view the loss function has in this
case no quadratic symmetric form. The implications of such theoretical setup can be found,
for example, in Nobay, Peel (1998), Cuckierman (1999) or Gerlach (1999).
An asymmetry of the Bundesbank reaction function in respect to the in°ationary developments
may be caused by the existence of short-run nonlinear convex Phillips curve. The convexity of
the Phillips curve implies that at any given point on the curve, the in°ation increase associated
with an incremental decline in the unemployment rate exceeds the in°ation decline associated
with an equal rise in the unemployment rate. The main di®erence between the linear and
convex Phillips curves that in case of convexity, the short-run tradeo® facing policymakers is
a function of the state of the economy: a one percentage point decline in the unemployment
rate leads to a smaller increase in in°ation given high unemployment rates than in case of
low unemployment rates. There is some theoretical evidence that the convexity of Phillips
curve may induce an asymmetric form of the loss function that the central bank chooses to
minimize, which could result in the so called "opportunistic approach" to disin°ation. The
"opportunistic approach" to disin°ation is a monetary policy strategy in which the central
bank is ¯ghting against any incipient rise in in°ation, but waits for the next favorable in°ation
shock to lower in°ation toward the target, rather than seeking to actively lower in°ation in a
manner that pushes the unemployment rate higher. The results of this paper may suggest the
theoretical result. As outlined above the switches to the high in°ation aversion regime could
be caused by the sharp or long rises of in°ation.4 On the other hand there are no signi¯cant
reaction to in°ation during the phases of of its decline.
Some remarkable examples for the "opportunistic approach" can be found in Blinder (1997).
A theoretical model of monetary policy incorporating opportunistic disin°ation strategies was
4See ¯gure (3).
15introduced by Orphanides at al. (1996a, b). The implications of the short-run convex
Phillips curve are also investigated by Tambakis (1998) and Schaling (2000). Dolado
(2001) estimates a monetary policy rule under assumption of the convex Phillips curve.
An estimation with monthly data or a forward-looking speci¯cation could provide a starting
point for further research. Another possibility to extend the current work is a comparison with
the estimated monetary policy rules in other countries.
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